Events x402 REST usage
Query Ethereum contract event logs via eth_getLogs - filter by contract, topic, and block range
Daily transfers, volume and coverage →
47-85-47-24.sslip.io · 47-85-47-24.sslip.io · Infrastructure
Review a built-in risky Dockerfile for embedded build secrets, mutable base images, unverified downloads, unsafe permissions, root runtime, and package-manager hygiene without building or pulling an image
The payout address is also published by 10 other service(s); the volume cannot be attributed to one of them.
| Window | Observed | Transfers |
|---|---|---|
| Last complete day (2026-10-30) | — | — |
| Last 7 days | — | — |
| Last 30 days | — | — |
| Growth, 7d against the 7 before | not comparable | |
Daily history →. Observed transfers show value arriving at the payout address; they do not establish service revenue.
Receiving wallets are payment addresses published for this service. Sending wallets transferred funds to an exclusive receiving address; this alone does not prove a purchase or identify an agent.
| Network | Full wallet address | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Base | 0xfe8b1298727706a6d9737c5afbc7af8e76842b91 | Shared address · activity cannot be assigned to this serviceFrom source record · source: payai |
No sending wallet addresses have been retained for this service. Buyer wallets are unknown; daily totals and reported payer counts do not reveal their addresses.
Coverage includes retained scans only, not every historical transaction. Earlier daily totals cannot recover sender addresses. Sender lists exclude shared receiving wallets, whose transfers could belong to another service. A provider address does not establish wallet ownership.
Sorted by source-measured calls, not by our opinion. The right-hand figure is observed inflow, which stays empty for peers whose address is shared.
| With a measured call count | 972 (16.0 %) |
|---|---|
| With a published price | 1,116 (18.4 %) |
| With attributable inflows | 19 (0.3 %) |
| Observed inflows · 30d | $63.56 |
| Median measured calls | 2 |
| Median price per call | $0.01 |
Query Ethereum contract event logs via eth_getLogs - filter by contract, topic, and block range
Check if a URL is up: status, latency, redirects, title.
China pulse, cheap enough to POLL: what China is talking about RIGHT NOW and what is NEW since your last call - built for agents that monitor continuously. Returns `consensus` (phrases trending on 2+ of Weibo/Baidu/Douyi...
Get a client token for direct upload to Vercel Blob
Chosen by category and by whether we have measured them, not by who pays us. A sponsored placement in this list is labelled as such.
| Network | Scheme | Amount | Asset |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base | exact | 0.001 | USDC |
“exact” is the price per call. “upto” is a ceiling the client sets, not a price. Atomic amount 1000 = 0.001 USDC per call on Base.
endpoint
https://47-85-47-24.sslip.io/v1/dockerfile-risk
{
"type": "http",
"method": "GET",
"queryParams": {
"scenario": "risky-container-build"
}
}
{
"type": "json",
"example": {
"label": "paid-demo:risky-container-build",
"stats": {
"line_count": 8,
"stage_count": 1,
"instruction_count": 8,
"findings_by_severity": {
"low": 3,
"high": 9,
"medium": 0,
"critical": 0
}
},
"stages": [
{
"name": "stage-0",
"user": null,
"final": true,
"index": 0,
"from_line": 1,
"base_image": "python:latest",
"has_healthcheck": false
}
],
"profile": "production",
"summary": "BLOCK: 12 finding(s) across 1 build stage(s); 9 require resolution or explicit approval.",
"verdict": "BLOCK",
"coverage": {
"mode": "static-dockerfile",
"checks": [
"base-image immutability",
"build-secret handling",
"remote-download integrity",
"package-manager hygiene",
"runtime least privilege",
"file-permission and context-copy risk",
"process and healthcheck form"
],
"limitations": [
"Does not inspect image layers, package vulnerabilities, signatures, provenance, or runtime configuration.",
"Cannot verify .dockerignore contents or whether a remote artifact checksum is correct.",
"Findings are static release gates and do not replace an image scan or sandboxed build."
],
"build_executed": false,
"registry_contacted": false,
"secret_values_returned": false,
"filesystem_context_read": false
},
"findings": [
{
"code": "final_stage_runs_as_root",
"line": 1,
"stage": 0,
"message": "The final stage does not establish a non-root runtime user.",
"end_line": 1,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "container-least-privilege",
"instruction": "FROM",
"remediation": "Create or select a non-root account and set USER in the final stage."
},
{
"code": "mutable_or_latest_base_image",
"line": 1,
"stage": 0,
"message": "The base image is untagged or uses the mutable latest tag.",
"end_line": 1,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "docker-build-best-practice",
"instruction": "FROM",
"remediation": "Use a trusted image version and pin its sha256 digest."
},
{
"code": "secret_like_arg",
"line": 2,
"stage": 0,
"message": "ARG declares 1 secret-like key(s); values are intentionally omitted.",
"end_line": 2,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "docker-build-secrets",
"instruction": "ARG",
"remediation": "Pass build credentials with BuildKit secret or SSH mounts instead of ARG or ENV."
},
{
"code": "secret_like_env",
"line": 3,
"stage": 0,
"message": "ENV declares 1 secret-like key(s); values are intentionally omitted.",
"end_line": 3,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "docker-build-secrets",
"instruction": "ENV",
"remediation": "Pass build credentials with BuildKit secret or SSH mounts instead of ARG or ENV."
},
{
"code": "remote_add_without_checksum",
"line": 4,
"stage": 0,
"message": "ADD downloads a remote resource without an explicit checksum.",
"end_line": 4,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "dockerfile-reference",
"instruction": "ADD",
"remediation": "Use ADD --checksum=sha256:<digest>, or download and verify the artifact in one RUN layer."
},
{
"code": "sensitive_file_copied",
"line": 5,
"stage": 0,
"message": "A secret-like credential or configuration path is copied into an image layer; the path value is omitted.",
"end_line": 5,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "docker-build-secrets",
"instruction": "COPY",
"remediation": "Exclude the file with .dockerignore and inject required credentials through runtime or BuildKit secrets."
},
{
"code": "remote_script_piped_to_shell",
"line": 6,
"stage": 0,
"message": "A remotely downloaded script is piped directly to a shell.",
"end_line": 6,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "software-supply-chain",
"instruction": "RUN",
"remediation": "Download a versioned artifact, verify its checksum or signature, inspect it, then execute it."
},
{
"code": "tls_verification_disabled",
"line": 6,
"stage": 0,
"message": "A download command disables TLS certificate verification.",
"end_line": 6,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "software-supply-chain",
"instruction": "RUN",
"remediation": "Restore certificate verification and trust only an explicit CA when required."
},
{
"code": "world_writable_permissions",
"line": 6,
"stage": 0,
"message": "RUN creates world-writable permissions with chmod 777.",
"end_line": 6,
"severity": "high",
"standard": "container-least-privilege",
"instruction": "RUN",
"remediation": "Grant the narrowest owner/group permissions required by the runtime user."
},
{
"code": "missing_healthcheck",
"line": 1,
"stage": 0,
"message": "The production final stage has no active HEALTHCHECK instruction.",
"end_line": 1,
"severity": "low",
"standard": "dockerfile-reference",
"instruction": "FROM",
"remediation": "Add a bounded HEALTHCHECK or document that the orchestrator owns equivalent probes."
},
{
"code": "relative_workdir",
"line": 7,
"stage": 0,
"message": "WORKDIR uses a relative path.",
"end_line": 7,
"severity": "low",
"standard": "docker-build-best-practice",
"instruction": "WORKDIR",
"remediation": "Use an absolute WORKDIR for predictable filesystem layout."
},
{
"code": "shell_form_process_instruction",
"line": 8,
"stage": 0,
"message": "CMD uses shell form, which can complicate signal and argument handling.",
"end_line": 8,
"severity": "low",
"standard": "dockerfile-reference",
"instruction": "CMD",
"remediation": "Use JSON exec form for CMD when shell expansion is not required."
}
],
"risk_score": 100,
"analysis_id": "docker-324e1d9d94b0d50a2959",
"approval_gates": [
"Resolve or explicitly approve 9 critical/high finding(s) before publishing the image.",
"Confirm that no credential remains in image layers, build history, or copied context.",
"Require a documented exception if the production process must run as root."
],
"analyzer_version": "dockerguard-dockerfile/1.0"
}
}
Examples are the provider's own, not a call we made.
The payout address is shared with 10 other service(s). That is normal for facilitator and platform addresses, and it is why this profile shows no inflow figure. The volume exists — it just cannot be split without inventing a rule.
How attribution works →19 of 6,058 services (0.3%) in Infrastructure have attributable inflows; 972 have a source-measured call count. Median measured calls: 2.
Rank this category by observed inflows →Review a built-in risky Dockerfile for embedded build secrets, mutable base images, unverified downloads, unsafe permissions, root runtime, and package-manager hygiene without building or pulling an image
Quoted from PayAI · source record · read 2026-10-29
Attribution blocked
· confidence low
The payout address is also published by 10 other service(s); the volume cannot be attributed to one of them.
Why revenue is “unknown”. A revenue figure needs a receipt: an amount a buyer actually paid for this service. We hold none for this entry, and we hold no funds at all. What we have instead is nothing measurable: no price, no attributable address, no receipt. The payout address is also published by 10 other service(s); the volume cannot be attributed to one of them.
No daily history has been archived for this service yet. Open the full daily history →
A payment rail is where the provider asks to be paid. It is not proof that anything was paid through it.
One row per statement. “Verified” means we checked it ourselves and the finding is quoted. “Provider claim” means we read it in the provider's own record. “Not found” is a statement about our search, not proof of absence.
| Statement | Status | What we found | Source | Checked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Endpoint | Provider claim |
https://47-85-47-24.sslip.io/v1/dockerfile-risk
EvidenceAls Resource-URL im Bazaar-Eintrag geführt. |
facilitator.payai.network | 2026-10-29 |
| Input output | Provider claim |
Request/response examples published with the listing
EvidenceBeispiel-Ein- und -Ausgabe stammen aus dem Bazaar-Eintrag des Anbieters. |
facilitator.payai.network | 2026-10-29 |
| Payment | Provider claim |
1 rail: Base · payee 0xFe8b1298727706A6D9737C5afbC7AF8e76842B91
EvidenceAus den `accepts`-Einträgen: Netzwerk, Asset, Empfängeradresse und Betrag. Die Adresse ist die Grundlage der späteren On-Chain-Zuordnung; sie ist noch nicht durch eine eigene 402-Antwort bestätigt. |
facilitator.payai.network | 2026-10-29 |
| Pricing | Provider claim |
0.001 USDC per call
EvidenceAtomic amount 1000 = 0.001 USDC per call on Base. Netzwerk: Base. |
facilitator.payai.network | 2026-10-29 |
| Protocol | Provider claim |
x402 (HTTP 402 payment challenge)
EvidenceIm x402 Bazaar als zahlungspflichtige HTTP-Ressource gelistet (x402Version 2, Typ http). |
facilitator.payai.network | 2026-10-29 |
| Provider | Provider claim |
47-85-47-24.sslip.io
EvidenceDie Ressource wird unter diesem Host im x402 Bazaar geführt; die Angaben stammen vom Anbieter. |
facilitator.payai.network | 2026-10-29 |
We have not called this endpoint yet. Until we do, everything above is what the source published — no more.